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The classical gold standard has long been associated with long-run price stability. 
But short-run price variability led critics of the gold standard to propose reforms that look 
much like modern versions of price path targeting. This paper uses a dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium model to examine price dynamics under alternative policy regimes. 
In the model, a pure inflation target provides more short-run price stability than does the 
gold standard and, although it introduces a unit root into the price level, it leads to as 
much long-term price stability as does the gold standard for horizons shorter than 20 
years. Relative to these regimes, Fisher’s compensated dollar (or pure price path 
targeting) reduces inflation uncertainty by an order of magnitude at all horizons. A Taylor 
rule with its relatively large weight on output leads to large uncertainty about inflation at 
long horizons. This long-run inflation uncertainty can be largely eliminated by 
introducing an additional response to the deviation of the price level from a desired path.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A commodity money regime such as the classical gold standard has long been 
associated with long-run price stability. During that era, though, many economists 
worried about instability associated with the gold standard and proposed 
fundamental reforms. Fisher (1934) traces the evolution of the idea of a monetary 
standard based on a price index and describes 28 nineteenth century proposals 
made by legislators and prominent economists.
1 Perhaps the most well known is 
the compensated dollar proposal made by Fisher (1913) himself. Since the end of 
the gold standard, many economists have argued that a fiat money regime based 
on credible rules for low inflation could do better than commodity money (see, for 
example, Friedman 1951, 1960). In 1980 that promise was in doubt. High and 
variable inflation was the number one economic problem facing the major 
market-type economies. The U.S. gold commission was given a mandate to 
evaluate a future role for gold in the U.S. monetary system.
2 Since then, however, 
it appears that central banks have learned how to maintain low inflation in a fiat 
money system. Many central banks have adopted implicit or explicit inflation 
targets in this new era. 
In this paper we examine the price stabilizing characteristics of various 
monetary regimes, some with commodity money and some with only fiat paper 
currency. We demonstrate that pure inflation targeting in a paper money standard 
can deliver as much price stability as a commodity standard. The high inflation 
experience in the 1970s reflects central banks’ focus on goals such as output 
stabilization rather than inflation control. We also show that the degree of 
instability in the price level under either a commodity standard or inflation 
targeting is still an order of magnitude greater than is possible under Fisher’s 
compensated dollar proposal or a regime that targets a price path or, equivalently, 
a long-term average inflation rate. It is also shown that a central bank that pays 
some attention to a path for the price level can also pay attention to the real 
economy without sacrificing price stability.  
We use a dynamic general equilibrium model of a two-sector economy to 
evaluate the time-series properties of the price level associated with alternative 
monetary regimes. When we compare inflation data from the gold standard era 
with modern times we are comparing apples and oranges because the composition 
of the economy was much different then, as were data collection methods. There 
                                                 
1 Included among them were Stanley Jevons in 1876, Robert Giffen in 1879, Leon Walras in 1885, 
Alexander Del Mar in 1885, Alfred Marshal in 1887, F.Y. Edgeworth in 1889, and Knut Wicksell 
in 1898. 
2 See Report to the Congress of the Commission on the Role of Gold in the Domestic and 
International Monetary Systems, March 1982.   
were also very different government programs and regulations affecting the 
stability of the financial sector and the size of cyclical fluctuations in the two 
periods. The model allows us to examine the alternative monetary regimes under 
common (although artificial) economic environments. 
Our model is related to the multi-sector real business cycle model in Long 
and Plosser (1983) and the monetary business cycle model in Dittmar, Gavin, and 
Kydland (2005). We also draw from Sargent and Wallace (1983), who address 
fundamental issues about welfare and the evolution of commodity money. They 
showed conditions under which consumers are unambiguously better off if 
convertible paper replaces gold coins as the circulating medium of exchange. And 
they showed that in a world with two capital goods, the one with the lower 
depreciation rate emerges as commodity money. Although we label that 
commodity gold in this paper, we adopt a more general parameterization of the 
commodity, so that it functions as a capital good, a consumption good, and as 
money. We examine cases with pure commodity money and cases with pure fiat 
money where the central bank has full credibility for its policies. Therefore, we 
are not examining a key role of the gold standard as a rule for price stability or a 
mechanism for commitment (see Bordo and Kydland, 1995).  
Next, in Section II, we compare the behavior of the price level in 13 
countries under the classical gold standard regime (1880-1913) with behavior 
under recent fiat money regimes (1968-2001). Section III is a dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium model of an economy with alternative monetary 
arrangements. Section IV includes a brief comparison of the model properties 
with the cyclical behavior of output and prices in 13 countries that were on the 
gold standard from 1881 through 1913. In section V, we compare price dynamics 
under a pure commodity money standard and a regime built on Fisher’s 
compensated dollar proposal. Section VI analyses regimes with paper money and 
interest rate rules. 
 
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
Price stability is a vague term that may be defined on several dimensions. A stable 
price is not only one in which the price level does not drift away from a constant 
level, but it is also one in which the expected inflation rate is relatively 
predictable over all horizons. A price level is less predictable if the shocks to the 
price level are larger and if they are more persistent. We look at measures of 
average inflation to judge, ex post, whether a regime has been associated with 
price stability. We also estimate the persistence in the price level using the size of 
the largest root. This turns out, for reasons discussed below, not to discriminate 
very well between the monetary regimes. Therefore we focus on other measures  
of dispersion in the expected price level to gauge the effect of the monetary 
regime on price stability. 
The classical gold standard prevailed in all the developed economies in the 
period from 1880 to 1914. It provided a simple rule for domestic monetary 
authorities and for the international monetary system. The rule was to maintain 
the value of national currency in terms of a fixed weight of gold (this price is 
referred to as the mint price). In the United States, during this period, the mint 
price was set at $20.67 per ounce of gold. Under the gold standard, the purchasing 
power of gold will tend to equal the long-run cost of production.
3 According to 
Table 3 in Jastram (1977), the purchasing power of gold in the United Kingdom 
fell about 40 percent during the 240 years from 1560 to 1800. From 1800 to 1900, 
it rose 94 percent. This is a very small decline in the trend before 1800, but a 
faster rise afterwards (still less than 1 percent per annum). 
Column 2 of Table 1 lists the average inflation rate for the GDP deflator 
for 13 countries during the gold standard.
4 Inflation averaged about 3 percent 
annually in Australia and Finland, about 2 percent annually in the Netherlands, 
and slightly less in the United States. For the other nine countries (Canada, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway Sweden, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom), the average inflation rate was between plus and minus 1 percent for 
the period. The range of average inflation over 33 years of these 13 countries on 
the gold standard is from –0.6 to 3.0 percent with a mean of 0.9 percent. The 
standard deviation of average inflation across countries is 1.1 percent for this 33-
year period. 
                                                 
3 See Barro (1979) and Bordo (1981) for an introduction to the operation of the gold standard in 
theory and in practice. Goodfriend (1988) and Fujiki (2003) discuss the role of Federal Reserve 
institutions in operation of the gold standard.  
4 The GDP deflator was not available for Switzerland in the late 1800s, so we use the CPI. The 
data sources for the gold standard era for all countries except Australia are described in an 
appendix to Bordo and Jonung (2001). The price data for Australia come from private 
communication between Michael Bordo and David Pope at the Australian National University.  
 
Table 1: Measures of Price Stability 
Average Inflation and Persistence in the Price level  
 
  1880 to 1913  1968 to 2001 
  Inflation  ˆ
MU ρ  
95 ˆ ρ   SEE  Inflation ˆ
MU ρ  
95 ˆ ρ   SEE 
Australia  2.9 1.07  1.14  5.27 5.7 1.09  1.15 1.79 
Canada  0.8 1.08  1.15  3.78 4.6 1.09  1.16 1.41 
Denmark  -0.3 0.99 1.12 2.71  5.8  1.05 1.13  2.41 
Finland  3.0 0.75  1.10  2.49 6.6 1.08  1.14 1.91 
France  -0.1 1.00 1.12 4.51  5.4  1.08 1.14  1.28 
Germany  0.6 1.06  1.12  3.05 3.8 1.06  1.13 2.08 
Italy  0.6 1.07  1.14  3.05 8.2 1.07  1.14 2.17 
Netherlands 2.0 0.53  1.07 3.5  4.2 0.67  1.09 1.00 
Norway  0.7 1.06  1.13  2.51 4.8 1.07  1.14 3.50 
Sweden  0.3 0.57  1.08  2.47 6.1 1.09  1.16 1.69 
Switzerland  -0.6 0.55 1.07 4.68  3.8  1.07 1.14  1.48 
UK  0.4 0.71  1.09  2.86 6.7 0.53  1.07 1.47 
US  1.6 1.07  1.14  5.85 4.0 1.08  1.14 1.01 
Average  0.9 0.89    3.59 5.3 1.00    1.78 
Note: The price level is defined as the logarithm of the GDP deflator.  ˆ
MU ρ  is the median 
unbiased estimator. 
95 ˆ ρ is the upper end of a 90 percent confidence interval. SEE is the standard 
error of the equation in estimates of equation (1΄).  ˆ
MU ρ and 
95 ˆ ρ  are based on tables in Stock 
(1991) using estimates of equation (1΄). Shaded cells indicate that the Dickey-Fuller test rejects the 
hypothesis that there is a unit root in the logarithm of the price level at the 5 percent critical level. 
 
The classical gold standard ended with World War I. After the war it was 
reinstated as a gold exchange standard whereby member countries could hold 
international reserves as gold or in the currencies of the key countries: Britain, 
France, and the United States. The gold exchange standard was short-lived. 
Eichengreen (1992) describes the collapse beginning in 1931 in the face of the 
Great Depression and attributes it to fatal policy mistakes made by the United  
States and France. The Bretton Woods System established in 1944 was a weak 
variant of the gold standard. Under this system, the United States maintained gold 
convertibility at $35.00 per ounce while the other members maintained current 
account convertibility in dollars. Most of the adjustment mechanism of the gold 
standard was thwarted and monetary policy was only in part constrained by gold. 
The United States eliminated gold cover for currency issue in 1968 and cut the 
final link with gold in August 1971, when President Nixon permanently closed 
the gold window. Although many central banks continue to hold gold assets, no 
country has had a monetary standard with a link to gold since the 1970s. 
Today’s economies use fiat money and base their nominal anchor on 
policy rules such as inflation targeting. It took some time following the collapse 
of Bretton Woods for central banks to learn how to maintain low inflation and 
relative price stability. Column 5 in Table 1 reports the average inflation rate 
(again for 33 years—1968 to 2001) in the GDP deflator for the same 13 countries 
that had been on the gold standard.
5 The two most successful countries, Germany 
and Switzerland, had 3.8 percent average annual inflation rates, about a 
percentage point higher than the highest inflation rates observed during the gold 
standard era. The worst performance was in Italy where the price level rose by a 
factor 18 (8.2 percent average annual inflation rate). In the United Kingdom the 
price level rose by a factor of 11 (6.7 percent inflation average). For the other 8 
countries, the price level rose between a factor of 4.2 in the United States (4.0 
percent average inflation) and 7.9 in Sweden (6.1 percent average inflation). The 
average inflation rate was much higher (4.5 percentage points higher) in the 
modern period, although the standard deviation of inflation rates across countries 
(1.3 percentage points) was only slighter greater than during the gold standard. 
In our model of the gold standard, the price level is stationary. Our prior is 
that the data should reject a unit root in the price level if the data are generated in 
an era with a successful gold standard. We define persistence using a median-
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where p is the log of the GDP deflator, t is a time trend, k is the number of lags of 
price level in the equation, and εt is a serially uncorrelated, homoskedastic 
                                                 
5 The modern GDP deflator data are calculated from time series of real and nominal GDP provided 
by the OECD as of January 2003.   
random error term. The largest autoregressive root, ρ, is defined as the largest root 
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A median-unbiased estimate of the largest root is calculated using the test 
statistic from the augmented Dickey-Fuller (1981) equation, which is a 
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where  1. ii i ω αα − =−  A distribution for OLS estimates of the t statistic, denoted ττ, 
on α1 is presented in Fuller (1976). We use the Akaike information criterion to 
choose the lag length, k. Using Table A1 from Stock (1991), information about ττ 
can be used to form a median-unbiased estimate of the largest root, ρ
MU, for each 
price series. We also present the 95th percentile value for this estimate, ρ
95, which 
is the upper limit of a 90 percent confidence interval. 
Columns 3 and 4 report ρ
MU and ρ
95 for the gold standard era. We found 
that the average lag chosen was two years, although the mode was only one. The 
median unbiased estimates of the largest root ranged from 0.53 in the Netherlands 
to 1.08 in Canada. We never reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 5 
percent critical level (a one-sided test; ρ
95 > 1 in every case). 
Higher inflation during the fiat money era is also matched by higher 
estimates of persistence. The last four columns of Table 1 report the summary 
statistics for the modern period. The average lag length is 2.9 for the 13 countries. 
The median-unbiased estimates of the largest root range from 0.53 in the United 
Kingdom to 1.09 in Australia, Canada, and Sweden. The average ρ
MU for the 
period was 1.00. Not surprisingly, we find that ρ
95 is greater than unity for all the 
countries. 
We were surprised to see that this measure of price stability did not 
distinguish between the gold standard and the recent period of relatively high 
inflation. The problem arises because the price level in both periods reflects 
persistence coming from real shocks. In our models, when one calibrates the 
autocorrelation in the technology shocks to match the properties of output, the 
persistent real shock induces a near unit root in the price level. With these 
persistent shocks to output, it is impossible to distinguish between a unit root and 
a near unit root in the price level in periods as short as 33 years. This is also true 
for inflation under inflation targeting regimes. Therefore we rely on simulations 
of inflation over long horizons to gauge whether one regime results in more or 
less price stability than another.  
Another dimension of price stability is the variability of innovations to the 
time series. Column 5 and 9 in Table 1 report the standard error of the estimate 
(SEE) of the Dickey-Fuller equation as a measure of the short-run predictive 
uncertainty. During the gold standard era, the average annual SEE was 3.6 
percent. This relatively high short-run uncertainty about the price level was a 
factor leading Irving Fisher and others to advocate monetary reform.  
In the recent period the average annual SEE was just half as large at 1.8 
percent. As did Klein (1975), we find that although the average inflation rate was 
higher during the fiat standard, the short-run predictive uncertainty was lower. 
Meltzer and Robinson (1989) argue some of the high volatility in the earlier 
period is due to the composition of output and the poorer quality of measurement.  
 
III. COMMODITY MONEY IN A TWO-SECTOR MODEL 
 
We begin by describing the model with pure commodity money. Later, we add 
paper money to examine more realistic versions of the gold standard and to 
compare the gold standard with an economy with fiat money and a target for the 
inflation rate or a price path. The model has two goods, a commodity that is called 
gold and a composite good that includes everything but gold. The production 
sectors for these two goods are embedded in a neoclassical growth model. There 
are separate shocks to production technology in each sector, but no aggregate 
shock. Households consume both goods and firms use both as capital. Consumers 
hold money balances to reduce the time spent shopping. Several monetary 
regimes are considered, some with gold coins and some with paper money. In all 
cases, we assume perfect credibility for the government’s monetary policy. 
This is a closed economy model. Capital can be shifted between sectors 
with no resource cost so that gold production can respond rapidly to changes in 
relative prices. Thus, the fluctuations in domestic production play a role similar to 




To simplify the discussion (and because none of our results depend on having an 
exogenous growth trend), we describe the model without growth. Many identical 
households inhabit the model economy. Each household maximizes expected 
lifetime utility, 











⎣ ⎦ ∑   ,                                     (2)  
where  1 c  is nonmonetary gold,  2 c  is a composite good that includes everything 
else, 01 β <<  is a discount factor, and ℓ is leisure time. The functional form of 
the current-period utility function is  
12 12
1 1
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where  12 1 2 0 , 1, 0 1, and  0 μ μμ μγ << < + < >  but different from 1.  
In each period, the infinitely lived representative consumer decides how to 
allocate time between work, leisure, and time spent shopping for consumption 
goods. Larger money balances brought into the period decrease shopping time and 
increase the amount of time that can be allocated to work and leisure. At the end 
of the period, households decide how much money to carry into the next period. 
In the case of commodity money, they decide how much gold to convert into coin 
(or how many coins to melt).  
Household time spent on transactions-related activities in period t is given 
by  
( ) 0 . tt f
ω χ ωχ =− Ω                                       (4) 
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where t m is the nominal stock of money,  , it p  is the price of good i, and Ω is the 
level of payments technology, which is assumed to be constant. The price of gold, 
1,t p , is the numeraire, set equal to 1 in the first version of our model. By 
restricting Ω and ω to have the same sign and ω < 1, the amount of time saved 
increases as a function of real money holdings in relation to consumption 
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where hit , is time spent in production of good i.  
 Sector  output,  Yi,t, is produced using labor and capital inputs: 
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+= ∑ . Both goods are used as capital in both sectors. Competitive factor 
markets imply that in equilibrium each factor receives its marginal product. A law 
of motion analogous to that for individual capital describes the aggregate quantity 
of capital. The distinction between individual and aggregate variables is  
represented here by lowercase and uppercase letters, respectively. The technology 
changes over time according to  
,1 , ,1 ln( ) ln( ) ,
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technology is chosen to normalize output in each sector to 1.  
  The budget constraint for the typical individual is 
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On the left-hand side, the total of household consumption in period t plus assets 
carried into period t+1 (capital, net bonds, and money balances) are equal to 
output produced in period t plus assets brought into period t (capital, net bonds, 




A competitive equilibrium is achieved when the representative household and 
firm solves its optimization problem and all markets clear. The agent’s decisions 
can be reduced to the choice of labor hours,  , it h , next period’s capital stock, 
,, 1 ij t k + , next period’s money balances,  1 t m + , and net nominal borrowing,  1 t b + . 
When these choices are subtracted from the agent’s nominal income in the period, 
what is left will be split across consumption to satisfy the first-order conditions 
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The ratios of the marginal utilities of each type of consumption are equated to 
their relative prices in each period. 
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This is an augmented marginal utility of consumption that takes into account the 
direct impact of consumption on utility and the indirect impact that consumption 
has on leisure through its effect on shopping time. Equating these augmented 
marginal utilities across consumption goods gives us the intra-temporal first-order  
condition discussed above. Since these are equal across all forms of consumption, 
we can more simply express first-order conditions in terms of  1, tt κ κ = . We also 
note that, since individual output production functions have the form 
,
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. These conventions allow us to write the 
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This is similar to the usual condition that sets the ratio of the marginal utility of 
leisure to the marginal utility of consumption equal to the wage rate. The first-
order conditions taken with respect to the various kinds of capital take the form 
()
,1 ,1 ,1 1
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The term in parentheses above represents nominal return to the various types of 
capital. The agent chooses capital levels to equate their expected nominal returns. 
The first-order condition for nominal lending or borrowing takes the form 
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The first-order condition for next period's money balances is complicated because 
the choice of money affects the leisure choice in two ways. The amount of money 
held has a direct effect on shopping time and an indirect one through its effect on 
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If the agent’s choices don’t affect his shopping time, i.e., 1() 0 f χ ≡ , then the 
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Money will be held in equilibrium only if its expected return matches the rate of 
time preference.    
The prices for gold and the other good are determined by goods market 
clearing and the government’s monetary rule. In the first two cases, with the gold 
standard and with Fisher’s compensated dollar standard, the rule involves setting 
the mint price of gold. Households may choose to hold more or less money at the 
end of the period, when they can take their gold bullion to be coined or their 
excess coins to be melted. For simplicity, we assume this operation of transferring 
bullion to coin and back to bullion does not use up real resources.  
  Under the gold standard, the mint price (currency price of gold) is held 
constant. Under Fisher’s compensated dollar standard, the central bank constructs 
a price index and manipulates the mint price to fix the price of the non-gold 
composite good at its steady-state level. For the United States, Fisher 
recommended using the Bureau of Labor Statistic’s wholesale price index, which 
included over 250 items, but not gold.
6 In this simple case with only gold coins 
circulating as money, the model is the same as with the gold standard except that 
the government resets the mint price each period so that the price of the non-gold 
good is held constant. 
 
Introducing Fiat Money 
 
With paper money in the economy—whether or not it is backed by gold, the price 
levels are determined by goods market clearing and the central bank’s interest rate 
rule. The budget constraint, equation (8), is modified by adding transfers, vt, to the 
right-hand side. These transfers can be used to reduce shopping time in period 
t+1.
7 We will assume that the central bank has perfect credibility so that people 
are indifferent between holding gold and government-issued paper claims to gold. 
Thus, in equilibrium all money balances are paper.  
The central bank manipulates transfers to implement an interest rate rule 
of the type 
() 1 11 1 () () ( ) , tt y t p t p t R Ry y p p p p π νππ ν ν ν + =+ − + − + − + −            (17) 
                                                 
6 See Bureau of Labor Statistics (1920, Table 9). 
7 This follows the convention in Kydland (1989) and has the timing of a cash-in-advance model.  
where  1 tt t p p π − =−  is the aggregate inflation rate, yt is the aggregate of 
production from both sectors, pt is the log of the aggregate price level, p1t is the 
log of the price of gold, and the bar over a symbol refers to the steady-state value. 
We use alternative assumptions about policy parameters to model the various 
policy regimes. 
  To approximate the dynamics of the model, we use the approach described 
in King and Watson (1998). In the simple commodity money model we can 
reduce the agent’s decisions to the choice of hI,t, kI,j,t+1, and mt+1. Consumption 
ratios are equal to price level ratios, and since net borrowing is zero in 





We calibrate the model to a quarterly period, but then aggregate the model 
histories to an annual frequency when we compare the model results with 
historical data. The quarterly specification focuses in on the short-run dynamics 
and makes it easier to compare this model with the quarterly models that are 
typically used to study monetary policy issues. The quarterly discount factor, β, is 
approximately 0.99. The risk-aversion parameter, γ, is set equal to 2. The gold 
sector is small relative to the non-gold sector.  Without loss of generality, we 
normalize steady-state shopping time to zero and choose time units so that the 
sum of hours worked in each sector plus leisure is equal to unity in the steady 
state. Atack and Bateman (1992) report that the standard manufacturing 
workweek in 1980 was 10 hours per day, six days per week. This level seems 
much higher than today’s, but because there were fewer second workers in each 
household then, we assume that total labor time, h1 + h2 = 0.33—a workweek for 
the household overall that is only slightly higher than today. In the steady state, 
the gold sector uses only 5 percent of available labor, but this sector is slightly 
more capital intensive than the other sector. The labor share is set to 65 percent in 
the gold sector and 70 percent in the non-gold sector. 
The µi, the share of gold and non-gold consumption in the utility function, 
typically are determined from an intratemporal substitution condition such as 
. c MUM U w =    In the case of a one-sector model, the share of consumption is 
close to total time spent working. Here the majority of working time is spent in 
the non-gold sector, so μ2 here is quite close to total labor time. Since the 
intratemporal trade-off between labor and consumption is complicated in our 
model by the presence of shopping time, the ratio of marginal utilities depends on 
both wage rates and shopping time. The first-order conditions taken with respect 
to consumption and labor (equations 9 and 12) are used to calculate the values of  
μi implied by the assumptions about hours worked and shopping time; these are 
µ1 = 0.015 and µ2 = 0.341.  
The share of gold capital is small relative to other capital. We assume the 
gold capital share is 0.05 in the gold sector and 0.03 in the goods sector. We use a 
quarterly depreciation rate of 0.005 for the gold capital and 0.025 for other 
capital. There are two independent shocks to production technology, one in the 
gold sector and one in the goods sector. The standard deviation of the technology 
shock to the non-gold sector is set equal to 1 percent per quarter, larger than 
recent times, but consistent with output volatility of that era. The autocorrelation 
parameter on this shock is set to 0.95. 
Historically, shocks to the gold sector took many forms. There were new 
gold mines discovered, new veins of gold in existing mines, and permanent 
improvements in the technology for extracting gold. In this paper, we consider 
only a temporary shock to the gold sector. Consider our shock to gold production 
to be the discovery of a new vein of gold in an existing mine. The newly 
discovered veins have layers of gold that are increasingly more costly to extract 
so that the increase in productivity is persistent, but not permanent.  
The shock process for gold production is calibrated to capture the effect of 
uncertainty in production as well as the effect of international gold flows. We 
calculated the standard deviation of world gold production (for the years 1981 to 
1913) to be 7.4 percent annually and of U.S. gold production to be 6.8 percent. 
When we add net international gold flows in the United States to U.S. gold 
production (not growth) we find that the variability of the total doubles.
8 Canjels, 
Prakash-Canjels, and Taylor (2004) find that international gold flows were large 
and quite responsive to small deviations of the gold price from parity. Although 
this is only suggestive about the size of the shock to the gold sector, it suggests 
that the shock to the gold sector is larger than the shock to the non-gold sector. 
Here we assume that the standard deviation of the gold shock is 2 percent per 
quarter, double the standard deviation of the shock to the non-gold sector. We 
also set this autocorrelation parameter equal to 0.95. With this calibration in the 
model under the gold standard, shocks to the gold sector explain about half of the 
variability in the inflation rate at all horizons.  
 In addition to normalizing steady-state output to unity in each sector, we 
also normalize the price of gold to unity. These choices, coupled with an 
assumption about the income velocity of money, determine the steady-state 
money stock. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) report that M2 velocity was about 4 
when the United States went on the gold standard in 1879. With this velocity 
                                                 
8 The data used in these calculations can be found in the Statistical Compendium to the Report to 
the Congress of the Commission on the Role of Gold in the Domestic and International Monetary 
Systems, March 1982.   
assumption and the household’s first-order condition for the choice of money 
holding, the implied value of the scale parameter, Ω, is –0.0037. The shopping 
time parameter, ω, is chosen to be equal to –2. This value implies steady-state 
money demand function with an interest rate elasticity of –1/3 and a consumption 
elasticity of 2/3. The calibration of the parameters of the interest rate rule is 
discussed in each section as the particular rule is introduced. 
 
IV. MODEL VALIDATION  
 
Backus and Kehoe (1992) presented evidence about the cyclical behavior of 
economies during the gold standard era. They conclude that there is similarity 
across countries and time in the cyclical patterns for real variables, but the 
patterns for nominal variables were quite diverse. This result, also documented by 
Bergman, Bordo, and Jonung (1998), is evident in Table 2 which displays the 
cyclical variability of output, prices, and inflation for our gold standard model and 
the 13 countries that were on the gold standard. The last two columns include the 
covariance of output with prices and inflation. 
 
Table 2. Cyclical Patterns in the Model and in the Gold Standard Countries (1881-1914)
  Standard Deviations (% a.r.)  Correlations 
  y p π   ρ(y, p)  ρ (y, π) 
Gold standard model  2.71  3.04  0.83    -0.65  -0.16 
with convertible paper*  2.49  2.91  0.82    -0.52  -0.19 
Australia   4.68  4.85  5.67    -0.07  -0.27 
Canada   3.60  3.18  3.52    0.23  -0.23 
Denmark   2.85  2.83  2.65    -0.50  -0.17 
Finland   3.58  2.79  2.91    -0.22  -0.37 
France   3.91  3.71  4.64    -0.48  -0.46 
Germany   3.08  2.74  3.11    -0.46  -0.17 
Italy   2.75  2.51  2.99    0.10  -0.19 
Netherlands   6.84  3.75  4.92    -0.75  -0.43 
Norway   1.87  3.08  2.54    0.62  0.18 
Sweden   2.75  3.26  2.80    -0.07  -0.04 
Switzerland   4.70  5.49  4.67    -0.78  -0.31 
UK   3.52  2.78  3.04    -0.63  -0.67 
US 1.84  4.85  5.61    0.10  0.24 
Notes: Output, y, the price level, p, and inflation, π, have been detrended using the HP filter. 
*With this calibration, the interest rate rule has a weight of 0.25 on the gold price. 
  
  The first two rows display the model results. The technology shock 
processes were calibrated to approximately match the average output volatility of 
the gold standard countries. The top row shows the model results where all money 
is commodity money and the gold price is fixed. The price variability is about the 
same order of magnitude as output volatility. This is also the case for the gold 
standard countries. The second row shows results when we add convertible paper 
money and the central bank uses an interest rate rule to target the price of gold. 
One puzzling aspect of the gold standard model is that the inflation volatility is 
much lower than in the data and much lower than price level volatility. 
  The last two columns describe the cyclical behavior of prices and 
inflation. Here we can see the problem in trying to match the gold standard facts. 
The correlations for the price level and output vary between –0.78 and 0.62. The 
price-output correlation in the gold standard model without convertible paper is 
–0.65, but when we add paper currency we get 0.33. The correlations for the 
inflation rate and output vary between –0.67 in the United Kingdom and 0.24 in 
the United States. In our model, the correlations are negative. They become larger 
in absolute value with interest rate smoothing. 
  Overall, our model cannot explain the diversity we see among the gold 
standard countries. We speculate that building a business cycle model to explain 
these facts will require extensions involving banking institutions, international 
trade, and, perhaps, a richer set of shocks. Therefore, we focus on issues involving 
price dynamics that are mainly a function of the policy process and leave the 
business cycle issues to future research. 
 
V. DYNAMICS OF ADJUSTMENT WITH COMMODITY MONEY 
 
In these first two regimes, all money is in the form of gold coins. Under the gold 
standard, the government sets the mint price for gold at the steady state level, 
which, in our model, is normalized to unity. In the case of Fisher’s compensated 
dollar, the government resets the price each period to keep the goods price 
constant. In both cases, we assume that the government’s policy is fully credible 
and have abstracted from the resource costs that would occur if the government 




Figure 1 shows the response of our gold standard economy to technology shocks. 
The upper left panel of Figure 1 shows the sector responses to a gold technology 
shock. Resources move to the gold sector to take advantage of the higher marginal 
products for capital and labor. By the end of the second period, gold output rises 
almost 13 percent above the steady state. The output of other goods declines  
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Figure 1: The Gold Standard and Technology Shocks 
Percent
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Responses are quarterly. The shocks are one-standard deviation calibrated to 2 percent 
for the gold technology shock and 1 percent for the non-gold goods technology shock.
Percent
Percent Percent
Goods technology shock Gold technology shock
 
Aggregate responses are shown in the bottom left panel. We use the 
steady-state values as fixed weights in the aggregation. The steady-state output 
levels are normalized to unity, so the aggregate price level is just the sum of the 
sector prices. We use the steady-state prices (1.0 for gold and 17.6 for goods) as 
relative weights in the output index. The price of other goods jumps about 1 
percent in the first period, stays at that level for about 2 years, and then gradually 
falls back to the steady state. Output rises slightly in the first period but quickly 
reverses.  
The upper right panel in Figure 1 shows how the economy responds to a 
shock to production technology for goods. The economic responses to a goods 
shock are much larger than those to a gold shock because the goods sector uses 95 
percent of market labor time (in the steady state) and represents about 93 percent 
of expenditures on output. Following this goods technology shock, gold output 
falls 8 percent below the steady state as resources now move to the goods sector.  
Goods output peaks about 2 percent above the steady state in the second quarter 
following the shock. The lower right panel shows the aggregate response to a 
goods shock. A 1 percent shock to the goods technology leads to a peak in output 
in the second period about 1.6 percent above the steady state. The price level falls 
by 0.7 percent in the first period, stays at that level for about 2 years, and then 
begins a slow return to the steady state. Notice that although the gold sector is 
much smaller and a gold shock has only a small effect on real output, it has about 
the same order of magnitude impact on the aggregate price level as does the goods 
sector shock. 
This result—that output in each of the two sectors moves counter to the 
other in response to sector shocks—is common in multisector models without 
adjustment costs (see Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1989, and Huffman and 
Wynn, 1999). While this rapid transfer of capital and labor across sectors is not 
typical of modern business cycles, it is consistent with stories from the period. 
Certainly, the discovery of gold at Sutter’s mill in California in 1848 led to a rapid 
deployment of labor and capital to the area. 
  Next, we use the gold standard model to compute artificial histories to 
measure percent deviation of inflation from steady state over various horizons. In 
this log linear model, the percent deviations from steady state are symmetric. In 
Table 3 we report the standard deviation of the average inflation outcomes in 
10,000 experiments at horizons of 1, 5, 15, and 30 years. That is, at each horizon 
we are measuring the average inflation rate over the interval from the initial 
period. Row 1 reports the results for the baseline case under the gold standard. 
The standard deviation for the year ahead is 1.11 percent, more than five times 
larger than the uncertainty at 30 years (0.19 percent). About half of this volatility 
is due to the output shock. In row 2, we show that even if there were no 
technology shocks in the gold sector, we would still have considerable uncertainty 
in the 1- to 5-year horizon. 
 
Table 3: Term Structure of Inflation Uncertainty with the Gold Standard and Price 
Level Rules:  Standard Deviation of Average Inflation from Steady State (Percent) 
Horizon  1 year  5 year  15 year  30 year
Gold  standard  1.11 0.93 0.37 0.19 
Gold standard (no gold shocks)  0.64  0.52  0.20  0.10 
Compensated dollar   0.07  0.05  0.02  0.01 




Fisher’s Compensated Dollar 
 
Fisher (1913) proposed the compensated dollar scheme in which the central bank 
would construct and target a price index for the basket of non-gold goods. 
Although this plan was never implemented, it is interesting because it is a 
forerunner of modern proposals to target the price level and actual inflation-
targeting regimes. In this simple case with only gold coins circulating as money, 
the model is the same as the gold standard except that the government manages 
the mint price so that the price of the non-gold good is stabilized at its steady-state 
level. Thus, there will still be some variation in the aggregate price level that 
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Figure 2: Gold Standard Vs. Compensated Dollar 
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Responses are quarterly. The shocks are one-standard deviation calibrated to 2 
percent for the gold technology shock and 1 percent for the non-gold goods 
technology shock. The gold standard responses are shown with a dashed line and 
the compensated dollar responses are shown with a solid line.
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The significant difference between the economies under these two alternative 
regimes is in the behavior of relative prices. The compensated dollar standard 
requires the mint price to be adjusted in a way that causes a larger change in the  
relative price of gold in response to all shocks. The top two panels in Figure 2 
show the relative gold price responses to a gold technology shock (left panel) and 
the non-gold goods technology shock (right panel). Under the gold standard, the 
gold price is fixed and the price level rises about 1 percent in response to a 2 
percent gold shock (causing the relative price of gold to fall). Under Fisher’s plan, 
the government must lower the mint price by more than 1.5 percent to prevent the 
goods price from rising. The top right panel shows the response of the relative 
gold price to a shock to technology in the goods sector. Under the gold standard, 
price level falls about 0.7 percent, raising the relative price of gold. Under 
Fisher’s plan, the government raises the mint price by more 1 percent to prevent 
the goods price from falling. The output responses to shocks are very similar to 
those under the gold standard and are not shown here. 
The lower panels in Figure 2 show how the money supply differs under 
the two regimes in response to both shocks. Under the gold standard a gold shock 
causes a rise in nominal consumption expenditures that leads to a rise in the 
demand for money balances. This effect dominates the relative price effect that 
induces an increased use of gold capital in the gold sector. Under the compensated 
dollar, nominal consumption spending is relatively unchanged. The lower relative 
price of gold causes it to be used more intensely in gold production with a 
negative effect on the level of money balances (see the lower left panel). 
Under the gold standard, a shock to technology in the goods sector causes 
the goods price to fall, leading to a decline in the demand for money balances. 
Under Fisher’s plan, the government raises the mint price by more than 1 percent. 
The increase in nominal consumption spending is all due to higher real spending, 
inducing a persistent rise in money balances above the steady state (see lower 
right panel). 
Table 3, row 3 reports the uncertainty about average inflation with the 
compensated dollar. The standard deviation of the average inflation rate is less 
than 0.1 percent at all horizons. The price of the non-gold good is stabilized 
exactly, so that the remaining uncertainty in the inflation rate is coming from the 
price of gold. The implied uncertainty about the inflation rate is an order of 
magnitude smaller with the compensated dollar regime than is under the gold 
standard. 
 
VI. PAPER MONEY AND INTEREST RATE RULES 
 
Conceptually, one of the important criticisms of the gold standard was that gold is 
a real resource with uses other than money. If the government issues paper 
certificates that are claims to gold, and the policy is credible, replacing costly gold 
with paper money should release real gold resources and result in higher welfare. 
In Sweden the government and the banking system operated with convertible  
paper money and low gold reserves.
9 As long as people were willing to hold the 
paper as if it were gold, there was little need to hold large gold reserves. With our 
assumption of perfect credibility, all money is paper and all gold is consumed or 
used as capital, so consumption and utility are higher than they are when gold 
coins are used as money.
10 
Under a gold standard with paper money, the central bank uses an interest 
rate rule to maintain the gold price close to par. The interest rate rule is defined by 
the set of policy parameters:  1 ( , , , ) (0, 0, 0, 0.25). ypp π ν ννν =   The parameter 
1 p ν was calibrated to match the term structure of volatility of the average inflation 
rate under the gold standard (row 1 of Table 3). The first two lines of Table 2 
show that the short-run behavior of output and the price level are quite similar for 
the pure gold standard and the gold standard with fiat money. With this 
calibration, the gold price rarely strays outside of a range of plus or minus 0.6 
percent. Officer (1986) estimates that the gold points averaged 0.64 percent of 
parity between 1890 and 1908. Results by Canjels et al. (2004) suggest that this 
may exaggerate the actual movements in the gold price relative to history. Using a 
recently developed daily time series on New York dollar-sterling exchange rates, 
they estimate that the gold points declined gradually from about 0.3 or 0.4 percent 
of parity in 1879 to about half of that in 1913.  
Adding paper claims to gold in a credible regime allows households to use 
more of the gold as capital and consumption, raising output and utility. The 
dynamics of the price level also change, but not much. Following a gold 
technology shock, the price of other goods rises and the price of gold falls 
slightly. With this calibration, a gold shock causes the aggregate price level to 
jump about 1.4 percent (see Figure 3). The real rate rises with the increase in the 
marginal return to capital. The policy rule requires the nominal rate to fall below 
the steady-state rate. The equilibrium path for the price level requires a long 
period with enough deflation to produce the spread between the real rate and the 
nominal rate implied by the rule. This is achieved by the unexpected rise in the 
price level associated with the shock and the subsequent gradual return to the 
steady state. The size of the government’s reaction determines how much the 
price level will jump. A more aggressive response—a larger parameter—causes a 
larger initial jump in the price of other goods and a higher average deflation 
during the transition back to the steady state. 
                                                 
9 See Jonung (1984). 
10 Again, this assumes perfect credibility. Friedman (1986) argues that there is a demand of gold as 
a monetary asset when there less than perfect credibility in a regime with irredeemable paper 
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Figure 3: Aggregate Price Dynamics
Percent
Price Responses to Gold Shock










Following a shock to goods technology, the price of gold tends to rise and 
the price of other goods falls. As in the case of the gold shock, the real rate rises. 
Now, the nominal rate must also rise to prevent the gold price from rising. An 
equilibrium response with the gold price policy rule requires the price level to fall 
enough in the initial period so that the subsequent inflation is consistent with the 
paths for nominal and real interest rates. With both shocks, the gold price target 
exacerbates the fluctuations in the goods price relative to those expected under the 
gold standard.  
Inflation Targeting  
 
In this regime the central bank uses the interest rate rule to target the aggregate 
inflation rate. Here, we ignore the effect of policy-induced shocks and, as before, 
we assume complete credibility for the policy.
11 The pure inflation targeting rule 
is given by  1 ( , , , ) (1.5, 0, 0, 0). ypp π ν ννν =  The aggregate price level response to 
shocks with an inflation target is also shown in Figure 3. The central bank sets the 
interest rate target equal to its steady-state value plus 1.5 times the deviation of 
aggregate price inflation from the steady state. We chose the value reported by 
Taylor (1993) as “working well” in the post-1980 U.S. economy. A gold 
technology shock causes the real rate and the aggregate price level to rise. Here, 
however, gold is just another commodity. The inflation rule eliminates the need 
for a jump in the price level and, thus, the inflation response remains small. Thus, 
as we found for the compensated dollar, inflation targeting will eliminate the price 
fluctuations induced by shocks to the gold sector. However, an inflation target 
does not help much when there are shocks to the goods sector. The price response 
is damped slightly in the short-run, but the price effects go on much longer 
because there is no direct mechanism for correcting for the deviation of the price 
level from the steady state. 
 
Inflation Targeting and Inflation Uncertainty 
 
Table 4 reports the standard deviation of the average inflation rate for alternative 
interest rate rules. With pure inflation targeting (and no policy-induced errors), 
there is little uncertainty about inflation at any horizon. The situation changes, 
however, if the central bank reacts to output. Increasing the weight on output νy 
from 0 to 0.0125 raises the standard deviation of the 30-year average inflation rate 
from 0.26 to 0.52 percent. Increasing the weight again to 0.05 almost triples the 
standard deviation to 1.43 percent. If we increase the weight on output to the 
value suggested by Taylor (1993), νy = 0.125, the standard deviation jumps to 
4.28 percent. This is large relative to actual experience, even during the high 
inflation period of the 1970s. To adequately replicate that experience, we can 
assume a lower weight on real output or add come concern about past deviations 
of inflation from target.
12 
                                                 
11 See Erceg and Levin (2003) for an analysis with imperfect credibility. See Ireland (2007) and 
Gavin, Keen and Pakko (2006) for an analysis of policy-induced errors. 
12 An alternative way to show concern about past deviations of inflation from target is to have a 
target average inflation over several period, see Nesson and Vestin (2005).  
 
Table 4: Term Structure of Inflation Uncertainty with Inflation Targeting Rules: 
 Standard Deviation of Average Inflation from Steady State (Percent) 
Interest rate rules of the form  1 ( , , , ) (1.5,  , 0, 0) ypp y π ν ννν ν =  
0 y ν =   0.07 0.17 0.17 0.26 
0.0125 y ν =    0.06 0.18 0.42 0.52 
0.05 y ν =   0.23 0.91 1.41 1.43 
Taylor rule ( 0.125 y ν = )  0.78 3.17 4.44 4.28 
 
Price Path Targeting and Inflation Uncertainty 
 
Looking back to the fourth row in Table 3 we see that a pure price path target can 
come close to mimicking Fisher’s compensated dollar in our model if the central 
bank targets a path for the aggregate price level with νp = 0.2. As with the 
compensated dollar, the price level is anchored in the long run, and the 
uncertainty at all horizons is an order of magnitude smaller than with an inflation 
target or with the gold standard. 
  Table 5 shows results in which we start with the Taylor parameter of 0.125 
on output, but also include a response to the deviation of the price level from the 
steady state path. Just adding a small weight (0.0125) reduces the standard 
deviation of the 30-year inflation rate to 1.06 percent. Increasing the weight on 
the price level deviation reduces the uncertainty across all horizons. If we set the 
weight on the price level equal to the weight on output (0.125), then the term 
structure of uncertainty lies within the envelope that we found for the gold 
standard. 
 
Table 5: Term Structure of Inflation Uncertainty with the Taylor Rule and Weight on a 
Price Path:  Standard Deviation of Average Inflation from Steady State (Percent) 
Taylor rules of the form 1 ( , , , ) (1.5, 0.125,  , 0) ypp p π ν ννν ν =  
0.0125 p ν =   0.67 2.19 1.86 1.06 
0.05 p ν =   0.74 1.67 0.83 0.43 
0.125 y ν =   0.39 0.63 0.30 0.15 
  
VII. SUMMARY OF MAIN RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 
 
The main results of this paper are illustrated nicely in Figure 4 where we report 
the results for every horizon from 1 to 33 years for four of the policy regimes—
the gold standard, a pure inflation target, an inflation target with a small weight on 
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Figure 4: Long-Run Inflation Uncertainty—Alternative Regimes 
Years
Pure Inflation targeting (no weight on output)
Gold Standard
Gold Standard
Taylor rule with 0.125 weight on the price level
The values in the figure 95 percent of the outcomes for deviation of the inflation 
rate the  steady state computed using 10000 replications of the relevant model.
Interest rate rule with 0.05 weight on output
 
The top panel of Figure 4 compares the gold standard with a pure inflation 
target. With our baseline calibration, 95 percent confidence intervals for the 
inflation rate under the gold standard are rather large (2 to 3 percent) for short  
horizons, but stabilize to plus and minus 3/4 percent at a 15-year horizon and 
decline to less than plus and minus 1/2 percent at 30-year horizons and longer. A 
credible pure inflation target would do much better, keeping inflation uncertainty 
at or less than plus or minus 1/2 percent for up to 30 years. As McCallum (1999) 
argued, a pure inflation target (one that does not include a reaction to real 
variables) does not involve much price level uncertainty even over horizons as 
long as 20 or 30 years. But the long-run uncertainty rises rapidly as the central 
bank begins to show some concern for real output. 
The bottom panel Figure 4 shows what happens if the central bank puts a 
small weight on output.
13 Here, inflation forecast uncertainty is quite low at a 1-
year horizon. It grows to match the uncertainty under the gold standard at a 5-year 
horizon and grows to plus a minus 3 percent at horizons of 20 years and longer. 
In the bottom panel of Figure 4 and in Table 4 we also report the results of 
a central bank that puts substantial weight on output (0.125 as in the Taylor rule), 
but also puts weight on the deviation of price level from a steady state path. With 
our policy vector  1 ( , , , ) (1.5, 0.125, 0.125, 0) ypp π ν ννν = , the short-run inflation 
uncertainty is half that associated with the Taylor rule and the long-run 
uncertainty is as small as with the gold standard (at least an order of magnitude 
smaller than with a rule that ignores the price level). 
The advantage of adhering to the gold standard is that it provides a 
market-driven mechanism to ensure long-run price stability. The disadvantage is 
that it involves significant resource costs and makes aggregate price level 
volatility depend on real shocks. Nevertheless, the gold standard has long been 
viewed as superior to an inconvertible fiat regime in providing for price stability. 
But a fiat regime based on a credible nominal anchor provides the price stability 
benefits of the gold standard with neither the resource costs nor the short-run 
variability associated with the gold standard.  
  Our computational experiments corroborate much of the accepted wisdom 
about the gold standard and provide insights about modern inflation targeting. As 
Irving Fisher argued, we find that if a central bank wants price stability for the 
short-term, then stabilizing a broad price index clearly dominates the classic gold 
standard. We find that adding some weight to a path for the price level gives the 
central bank the flexibility to respond to real output without sacrificing its goal of 
price stability. The intuition is simply that the target for the price path anchors 
long-term inflation expectations. 
 
                                                 
13 Here a 0.05 reaction to the output level for our quarterly specification of inflation and interest 
rates is equivalent to a Taylor rule with a coefficient of 0.2. The Taylor rule is generally written 
with the interest and inflation at annual rates.   
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